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DISCRIMINATION AT WILL:
JOB SECURITY PROTECTIONS
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
IN CONFLICT
ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom amongst scholars and advocates of
employment discrimination law is that the success of Title VII is
significantly hampered by the enduring doctrine of employment at will.
As long as employers have broad discretion to fire employees for any
reason, no reason, or a bad reason, employers can easily get away with
terminating or refusing to promote racial minorities and women as
long as some credible nondiscriminatory reason, such as personal
animosity, can be presented. This account feeds the widely accepted
view that employment at will and the goals of Title VII, namely equal
employment opportunity, are at odds. This article challenges this piece
of conventional wisdom by showing how job security protections can
also exacerbate racial inequality in employment. It examines recent
race riots and student protests against proposed labor law changes in
France to unearth the tension between combating racial discrimination
in hiring and protecting all employees’ job security. Scholars and
advocates of employment discrimination law should be aware of the
ways in which both employment at will and job security protections can
function in different contexts to exacerbate racial inequalities in
employment. Such awareness should encourage the development of a
broader perspective on equal employment opportunity that moves
beyond the limited set of problems that are identified by the litigation of
employment discrimination cases.

Is employment at will bad for racial minorities? Ever since
Title VII was proposed, the tension between employment
discrimination law and employment at will has been noticed.1
Recent empirical work shows that employment discrimination
plaintiffs lose a lot,2 and one widely shared explanation is that their
1

When Title VII was being debated, conservatives’ main objection to the
legislation was that it would interfere with employers’ freedom of contract. See
Minority Report Upon Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, Committee on
Judiciary Substitute for H.R. 7152, H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong. 1st Sess.
23534.
2
See Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 548 (2003); Wendy Parker, Lessons in
Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889
(2006); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?. 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
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cases are extremely difficult to win because of the enduring rule of
at will employment.3 Many scholars have argued or assumed that
racial minorities would fare better under a for-cause employment
regime, one that protects the legal right of all employees to job
security.4
This article challenges the notion that for-cause
employment would enhance equal employment opportunity for
racial minorities. It explains how a regime of general protections
of all employees’ job security, like those prevalent in many
European countries, can, over time, severely undermine racial
equality in access to employment.
France’s recent problems are instructive.
French
5
employment law made U.S. headlines in March 2006, as over a
million people across the country staged massive demonstrations
against a law that would have introduced a small dose of at will
employment into the French workplace.6 Departing from the
Labor Code’s general protection of employee job security, the
March 2006 law permitted employers to hire persons under the age
of 26 for a period of two years during which the employee could
be terminated for any reason. The “contrat première embauche,”
(CPE), or “first employment contract” provision, as it was known,

3

See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,”
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law
to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305
(1996); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1177 (2003); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment
After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2230 (1995); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing:
Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 (2006);
4
See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 156 (2003); Ann C. McGinley,
Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443 (1996);
Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At
will, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Opponents of New French Labor Law Step Up
Protests, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at A3; Elaine Sciolino & Craig S.Smith,
Protests in France Over Youth Labor Law Turn Violent, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 29,
2006, at A1, Sebastian Rotella & Achrene Sicakyuz, 1 Million Across France
March To Oppose Premier’s Key Labor Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at
A21, Molly Moore, Top French Tribunal Upholds Jobs Law, WASH. POST, Mar.
31, 2006, at A13.
6 See Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances, JORF du 2
avril 2006, at 4950, art. 11.
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was ultimately rescinded by the Government in response to three
weeks of nationwide strikes and unrest.7
An important fact that was largely ignored by American
press accounts is that the proposal to allow at-will employment in
limited circumstances was part of the law on “equality of
opportunities,”8 adopted in direct response to the violent race riots
throughout France in the fall of 2005.9 These riots also flooded
U.S. newspaper headlines,10 as the French government declared a
state of emergency in response to levels of unrest not seen since
the student protests of May 1968. 11 Seeking to alleviate the mass
unemployment of North African youths, the at will employment
provision of the Equality of Opportunities law was intended to
enhance the employment prospects of disadvantaged minorities.
The French experience provides a counterweight to
American understandings of the relationship between employment
discrimination and employment at will, which are predominantly
shaped by litigation experience. In France, the strengthening of
job security protections in the Labor Code over the last thirty years
has coincided with reforms to strengthen employment
See Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Will Rescind Labor Law That Caused Wide
French Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at A1. The legislature eventually
adopted a new law that replaced the article that contained the CPE provision.
See Loi no. 2006-457 du 21 avril 2006 sur l’accès des jeunes à la vie active en
entreprise, JORF du 22 avril 2006.
8
See Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances, JORF du 2
avril 2006
9
The initial report proposing the bill began with a discussion of the need to
respond to the problems of unemployment and discrimination that had motivated
the riots. See Laurent Hénart, Rapport no. 2825 fait au nom de la commission
des affaires culturelles, familiales, et sociales sur le projet de loi (no. 2787) pour
l’égalité des chances, 25 janvier 2006, at 7.
10
The increasing violence of the riots, and their spread throughout the nation,
were reported almost daily in most of the major U.S. newspapers for about two
weeks in November 2005, often on the front page. See, e.g., Craig S. Smith,
Chirac Appeals for Calm as Violent Protests Shake Paris’s Suburbs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A1; Cassell Bryan-Low & John Carreyrou; France
Authorizes Curfews as Riots Cast Doubt on Its Policing System, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 8, 2005, at A1; David Ignatius, Why France Is Burning, WASH. POST. Nov.
9, 2005, at A31. The riots also caught the attention of U.S. legal scholars. See
The French Riots--Posner's Comment, Becker-Posner Blog, November 13, 2005,
at
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/11/the_french_riot.html (last
visited July 21, 2006).
11
Mark Landler, France Declares State of Emergency; Curfews To Be Imposed,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A12.
7
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discrimination law. Yet, the racial gap in employment has only
expanded during this period.
The historical and current
sociological data support the conclusion that the Labor Code’s
employee job security protections have contributed significantly to
employers’ propensity to engage in both rational and irrational
discrimination against racial minorities in hiring. The recent
controversies in France, from race riots to student strikes, should
inform American approaches to reforming employment law to
eradicate racial inequality in employment.
Part I articulates the predominant view amongst American
scholars that at-will employment is at odds with the goals of
employment discrimination law. It begins by establishing that
equal employment opportunity has long been understood to be the
primary goal of Title VII.
Part II contrasts the goals justifying U.S. employment
discrimination law with those underlying French employment
discrimination law. In France, the Labor Code’s prohibition of
discrimination in employment is not about group-based
disadvantage: It is part of a general protection of employees’
rights against arbitrary treatment by the employer. This very
bundle of employee rights encompasses the right to job security.
Part III establishes that the widespread race riots
throughout France was a reaction, in large part, to the problem of
the mass unemployment of French people of North African origin
residing in the suburbs of major cities. It then argues that French
employee job security protections have, over the last thirty years,
have exacerbated racial disadvantage in access to employment.
Part IV explains why at-will employment was proposed in
France in order to alleviate racial inequality and promote equal
opportunity. It also explains the logic of the massive social
movement that resisted and ultimately killed the at-will provision.
Parts V and VI draw insights from the French experience
that illuminate a rethinking of American law’s pursuit of equal
employment opportunity. The central lesson is that limiting
employer discretion in termination can exacerbate discriminatory
tendencies in hiring. As a result, no reforms should be undertaken
without considering their broader potential effects on the political
economy of employment and their consequences for racial
minorities’ access to jobs. Such considerations may require
broader, long-term, approaches to equal employment opportunity
that move beyond the lens and apparatus of civil litigation.
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I.

Title VII and Employment at Will:
Coexistence

An Uneasy

C. Title VII’s Goal: Equal Employment Opportunity
The goal of employment discrimination law in the United
States is equal employment opportunity, defined in light of the
historical circumstances that gave rise to Title VII.12
So
understood, equal employment opportunity means eradicating the
disadvantages of excluded and subordinated groups in acquiring
and retaining jobs.13 More specifically, the primary goal of Title
VII, the first employment discrimination statute, was to eradicate
race-based disadvantages, particularly the severe disadvantages
faced by African Americans.14 As Alfred Blumrosen observed in
1968, the crucial social fact giving rise to Title VII was the
disproportionately high unemployment rate among blacks.15
Title VII also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex,
national origin, and religion,16 expressing the message that
employment disadvantage on the basis of membership in these
groups was also unacceptable. But it is clear that the main impetus
for passing Title VII was a growing civil rights movement whose
primary goal was to undo racial segregation and its disadvantaging
effects on African Americans in education and employment.17
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII was part,
was a comprehensive federal statute attempting to eradicate
various aspects of racial segregation and black disadvantage in
voting, employment, education, and public accommodations.18
So, naturally, the eradication of race-based disadvantage
has been articulated, both by scholars19 and by the Supreme
12

See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
14
See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 203.
15
See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 465 (1968) (attributing
this goal to the Truman Committee on Civil Rights in 1947).
16
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
17
See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY 53-56 (1992).
18
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964).
19
The classic statement to this effect was made by Owen Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL.& PUB. AFF 107 (1976) (arguing that the Equal
Protection Clause should be understood to prohibit group-disadvantaging state
13
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Court,20 as the main goal of employment discrimination law.
Although employment discrimination law has been extended to
other groups, the history of group-based disadvantage has always
been an important background for the interpretation of the
antidiscrimination norm. Although the statute protects employees
as individuals, it does so only insofar as the individual has been
treated badly as a member of a group, and does not protect the
individual from all forms of arbitrary and unjustified treatment by
the employer. These features of U.S. employment discrimination
law, as we shall see, make it distinctive.21
D. Employment at Will and Its Limits
The rule of employment at will allows either the employer
or the employee to terminate the employment relationship at any
time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason. As is well known,
the legal right to fire for bad reasons is not absolute;22 both
action). Cynthia Estlund has argued that Title VII should be understood as an
“equal protection clause for the workplace.” Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the
Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319
(2005). See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2006) (arguing that the best
explanation for employment discrimination law is its reflection of a broad goal
of social change to eliminate group-based status inequalities).
20
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the Supreme Court, in inventing the
disparate impact theory of liability, saw Title VII as requiring “the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.” 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
view that the goal of Title VII was to eradicate group-based disadvantage in
access to employment in United Steelworkers v. Weber, in holding that
voluntary employer affirmative action policies did not violate Title VII. The
Court characterized the goals of the Civil Rights Act as “the integration of
blacks into the mainstream of American society.” United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
21
For a more detailed discussion of the distinctive features of U.S.
antidiscrimination law as compared with the French model, see Julie C. Suk,
Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55
AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming August 2007)
22
Indeed, the defenders of employment at will view the limits imposed on it by
antidiscrimination, labor, and wrongful discharge doctrine to be excessive. See
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947
(1984); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1990); Andrew P.
Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful
Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996).
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legislatures and courts have rendered some reasons for termination
illegitimate.
Title VII is perhaps the most salient example. Title VII
prohibits the employer from terminating an employment
relationship based on the employee’s race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin.23 Other antidiscrimination laws, state and federal,
also protect against discrimination on the basis of disability,24
age,25 or sexual orientation.26 The antidiscrimination exceptions
to employment at will embody a policy against employment
decisions based on traits that have been but should not be a basis
for group disadvantage.27
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits employers
from taking adverse actions against employees due to their union
membership or activities.28 State whistleblower statutes protect
employees’ right to speak out with regard to the employer’s illegal
activities.29 And many state courts have invalidated or provided
remedies for wrongful termination when the termination is against
public policy, such as a termination in retaliation for an
employee’s reporting of a crime.30
Nonetheless, despite these restrictions on employer
discretion, the employee protections are exceptions that coexist
with the rule of at will employment. For the most part, employers
still retain broad firing discretion. In the early days of Title VII,
some American labor and civil rights scholars believed or hoped
that Title VII would be extended to encompass general job security
protections for all workers,31 especially after the 1973 case of
23

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (2000).
Americans With Disabilities Act , 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
25
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000).
26
For instance, New York’s employment discrimination statute includes sexual
orientation as a prohibited category. See N. Y. CLS Exec. § 296 (1a) (Consol.
2006).
27
Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At will World, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1669 (1996).
28
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
29
For example, New York has a whistleblower statute, at N.Y. Lab. Law. § 740
(Consol. 1988), and New Jersey has a Conscientious Employee Protection Act
that protects employees who engage in whistle-blowing activities. N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 34:19-1-19-8 (2006).
30
See, e.g., Petermann v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal.
1959).
31
See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: Workers Are Entitled to “Just
Cause” Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 519, 520 (1978) (“[T]he
24
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McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company32 read Title
VII to prohibit race-based discrimination against whites. But to the
dismay of many critics of employment at will,33 no such
universalistic ban on arbitrary discharge has emerged. An
employee cannot be fired on the basis of race, but she can be fired
for wearing a hairstyle that the employer doesn’t like.34 An
employee cannot be fired because he is black, but he can be fired if
the boss personally dislikes him and he happens to be black.35
E. Employment at Will and Title VII Litigation
Since Title VII was passed, allegations of discriminatory
firing have been litigated far more frequently than allegations of
discriminatory hiring.36 Most of these cases are individual
disparate treatment cases.37 In the at-will universe, the Title VII
plaintiff may allege that she was fired on the basis of race or sex,
but faces great difficulty in the doctrinal scheme of Title VII
litigation if the employer claims that she was fired for all kinds of
bad reasons, as long as those bad reasons are not group-based
traits. Obviously, such a defense, if true, is legitimate in a world
where at will employment is the background norm. By contrast, if
the background rule was a presumption of job security protection,
common law rule of employer discretion has been superseded by the principle
that personnel decisions must be based on just cause. The just cause standard
arse initially under Title VII . . ..”); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L. J,. 1, 20 (1979)
(arguing that McDonnell Douglas’s requirement that an employer-defendant put
forth a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” after a plaintiff’s prima facie case
effectively produced a just-cause standard).
32
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
33
See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000); ); Joseph
Slater, The “American Rule” That Swallows the Exceptions, EMPLOYEE RTS &
EMPLOYEE POL’Y (forthcoming 2007); Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will,
There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment
at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295 (2005).
34
Cf. Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that an employer policy prohibiting employees from wearing allbraided hairstyles is not a violation of Title VII).
35
These are the facts of St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks. See St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
36
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991).
37
Id.
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whereby the employee could not be fired except for just cause,
with just cause defined as employee’s job-related fault or
employer’s significant economic hardship, it follows that a
personal animosity defense (to name one example of a bad reason)
would not be a legitimate reason available to an employerdefendant in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Under a forcause employment regime, an employer’s inability to articulate and
prove a good reason for terminating an employee would enable the
employee plaintiff to prevail.
For the last fifteen years, employment discrimination
scholars have argued that the goals of Title VII have been
undermined by the endurance of the American doctrine of
employment at will.38 Although the critics of at will employment
acknowledge that the at will rule is formally limited by Title VII
and other exceptions,39 many scholars have argued that what
remains of employment at will seriously undermines the
effectiveness of employment discrimination law in bringing about
race and gender equality in the workplace. Specifically, the
background norm of employment at will affects the burdens of
production and proof under the McDonnell Douglas framework
when individual Title VII cases are litigated, often to the detriment
of plaintiffs.
The notion that employment at will is a doctrinal barrier to
the employment discrimination plaintiff’s case was fully
articulated after the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks.40 In that case, Hicks, a black correctional
38

See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and
Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1
(1990); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2230 (1995); Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protections in an At will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1996); William R.
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the Escalating
Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at
Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996); Ann C.
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will, 57 OHIO ST. L. J.
1443 (1996); Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and
Employment At will, 34 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001); Chad Derum & Karen
Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the
Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003).
39
For example, Cynthia Estlund points out that “the legal right to fire for bad
reasons has been virtually decimated.” Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protections in an At will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996).
40
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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officer was subject to repeated and severe disciplinary actions after
a new supervisor had come into office. The employee was
eventually demoted and then discharged. Hicks brought a Title
VII action, in which he presented a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas v. Green. 41 The defendant proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons that the district court found to be false.
Nonetheless, the district court found for the defendant because the
plaintiff had fnot proven that the employer’s actions were “racially
rather than personally motivated.”42
Prior to the Hicks case, Title VII plaintiffs alleging
disparate treatment benefited from an effective presumption that
discrimination had occurred based on circumstantial evidence if
they were able to prove the elements of a McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case. The employer would then have the burden of
producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.
After Furnco Construction v. Waters43 and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,44 some courts took this to mean
that, if the employer gave reasons that were not credible, or if the
employer gave no reason at all for its decision, the plaintiff would
prevail.45 However, Hicks held that, even if the employer puts
forth a reason that is not worthy of credence, or no reason at all for
41

Under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff could
establish a prima facie case without direct evidence by proving (1) that he was a
member of a protected group, (2) that he was qualified for the job, (3) he applied
for the job and was rejected, and (4) the job continued to remain open.
42
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993).
43
439 U.S. 567 (1978).
44
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
45
In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, the Supreme Court stated that “a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination onlly
because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors . . . we are likely to
presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons, especially in a business setting.” 439 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). In
Burdine, the Court extended this reasoning by explicitly noting that a plaintiff
can show that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer than
the proffered reason simply by showing that the proffered explanation was
unworthy of credence. 450 U.S. at 256. As Malamud notes, the circuits applied
Burdine very differently with regard to the question of whether a plaintiff who
convinced the factfinder that the employer’s proffered reason was false was then
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last
Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2223 n.23
(1993).
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its actions, the the trier of fact is not required to find for the
plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff proves that the employer’s falsity or
lack of reason stems from racial motivation (as opposed to, say,
arbitrary personal hatred), Hicks held that the plaintiff would not
be entitled to prevail.46 The implication of Hicks was that the law
permitted employers to act arbitrarily, irrationally and hatefully, as
long as the arbitrariness, irrationality, and hatred was not
motivated by one of Title VII’s protected categories, such as race.
Many scholars reacted to the Hicks decision by attacking
employment at-will.47 They argued that, in a workplace where
employers are permitted to terminate employees without just
cause, arbitrary acts against members of racial minorities and
women are not considered unlawful, however adversely it might
affect them.48 According to many commentators, the background
norm of employment at will prevented courts from recognizing the
situations in which arbitrary and adverse treatment of racial
minorities could constitute racial discrimination. Some critics, like
Ann McGinley, explicitly proposed the eradication of employment
at will through federal or state legislation,49 drawing on some
46

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
It should be noted, however, that scholars began to notice the significance of
employment at will as a barrier to the success of Title VII prior to Hicks. See,
e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note __, at 70-72.
48
See William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, the Rise of “Pretext Plus,”
and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law
to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV.
305, 330 (1996) (arguing that Hicks was evidence of the Supreme Court’s
refusal to displace employment at will to the extent necessary to effectuate Title
VII’s goal); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will
World, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1655, 1679 (1996) (arguing that employment at-will
undermines Title VII); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and
Employment at Will, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443 (1996) (urging the adoption of a
national discharge policy prohibiting employers from discharging an employee
without just cause, for the sake of achieving race and gender equality); Donna E.
Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At will, 34
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001) (proposing greater general protections for
employee job security, including prior notice of dismissal or pay in lieu of
notice, in light of the collaborative role played by employment at will in the
subordination of women and people of color). Deborah Malamud observed that
“wrongful, or at least undefendable, employer actions are significant problems
in the American workplace, even outside of the setting of actionable
discrimination.” See The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2233 n.23 (1993).
49
See McGinley, supra note 48, at 1511-12. See also Young, supra note 48.
47
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foreign countries’ laws protecting job security, which effectively
prohibit termination except for good cause.50
This critique has enduring salience in recent employment
discrimination scholarship.51 Building on the insights of law and
economics scholars, Cynthia Estlund, in her important and
acclaimed book, Working Together, argues that employers have
perverse disincentives to hire racial minorities when Title VII
operates in the context of employment at-will.52 Estlund builds on
an insight first mentioned by Richard Posner and developed by
John Donohue and Peter Siegelman with regard to the efficacy of
Title VII: The possibility of discriminatory firing suits under Title
VII leads the employer to avoid hiring minorities due to the
incurring expenses in a Title VII-firing suit.53 In their 1991
empirical study of employment discrimination litigation, Donohue
and Siegelman showed that, since the early 1970s, firing cases
under Title VII have overwhelmingly outnumbered hiring
charges.54 Under these conditions, a reasonable employer is likely
to fear a firing case more than a hiring case, which produces a net
50

McGinley borrows from the job security laws of the Virgin Islands, France,
and Germany, see McGinley, supra note __, at 1511, 151514, 1519-21.
McGinley acknowledges, however, that the labor laws of France and Germany
are more restrictive of the employer’s prerogative than her own proposal. Id at
1520-21. Young notes that the United States “stands virtually alone among
Western industrialized nations in its failure to furnish its workers adequate job
security.” Young, supra note __, at 355. See also Comment, Employment-at
will: The French Experience As a Basis For Reform, 9 COMP. LAB. L.J., 294
(1988); Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A
Comparative Study of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1033 (1995).
51
See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 Tex. L.
Rev. 1177 (2003) (arguing that both employment at will and the difficulties
faced by Title VII in addressing unconscious bias have detracted from
employment discrimination law’s ability to combat discrimination); CYNTHIA
ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003); Joseph Slater, The “American Rule” That
Swallows the Exceptions, EMPLOYEE RTS & EMPLOYEE POL’Y (forthcoming
2007).
52
See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 152 (2003).
53
Richard Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513, 519 (1987).
54
John J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1016 (1991) (see Figure 6).
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disincentive to hire racial minorities.55 As Ian Ayres and Peter
Siegelman put it, “protection against discriminatory firing acts as a
kind of tax on hiring those to whom it is extended.”56 Estlund
refers to this problem as the “at-will gap,” arguing that these
perverse disincentives arise largely due to the persistence of at-will
employment.57 The at-will employer can fire employees who are
unprotected by antidiscrimination statutes without fear of liability,
but cannot fire protected employees without considering the cost of
defending suit.58 One solution, Estlund argues, is to move to a
just-cause regime for the sake of “refining the ‘equal protection
clause’ of the workplace.59
Regardless of one’s policy conclusion as to whether
employment at will should be abolished in favor of a for-just-cause
employment regime, most U.S. scholars seem to agree that the
employment at will doctrine is in tension with employment
discrimination law. This explains why Richard Epstein, a vocal
defender of employment at will,60 has called for the repeal of
employment discrimination law.61
In other words, whether they come out in favor of a forjust-cause employment regime or not, most U.S. scholars see a
conflict between the goals and principles underlying the
employment at will doctrine and the goals and principles
underlying employment discrimination law. The conventional
wisdom is that employment at will undermines the goals of
employment discrimination law.
Furthermore, many
commentators assume that pursuing the goal of employment
discrimination law (namely, giving disadvantaged groups access to
good jobs) is contiguous with protecting all employees’ job
security.62 But the persistence of vast racial inequalities in
55

See id. at 1024.
Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-World as Red Herring: Why Disparate
Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1487
(1996).
57
Estlund, supra note 52, at 156.
58
Estlund also develops this view in Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX L. REV. 1655, 1679 (1996).
59
Estlund, supra note 52, at 156.
60
See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947 (1984).
61
RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 148 (1990).
62
See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No more: All Workers Are entitle d
to “Just Cause” Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 519, 565 (1978);
Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change
56
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employment in other post-industrial societies that have strongly
protected employee job security challenges this assumption.
II.

The French Alternative:
Republicanism
Universalism in Employment Discrimination Law

and

France provides a fruitful resource for thinking about job
security and racial inequality, particularly as recent waves of
internationally-noticed riots and strikes have highlighted these
issues. From an American perspective, the sight of a massive social
movement against a small dose of employment at will seems
surreal,63 since contingent employment with no legal protection of
job security is the norm for American workers.64
In France, by contrast, for-cause employment is the
background norm that shapes other aspects of workplace
regulation.
Like U.S. law, French law also prohibits
discrimination on the basis of group membership by employers,65
but unlike U.S. law, French labor law considers the norm against
discrimination as a natural extension of a general package of
employee rights protections. The norm against discrimination fits
comfortably with the Labor Code’s many limits on employer
in the Law, 40 OHIO. ST. L. J. 1, 49 (1979). More recently, Cynthia Estlund
argues that “the legal rights of employees and the corresponding limitations on
employer power that have developed since 1964 provide rudimentary analogues
to the constitutional rights of citizens as against the government,” suggesting
that the right against discrimination is part of a more universal right. See
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
318-19 (2005). Ann McGinley argues that “[a]n employee who is discharged
without just cause is an innocent victim of the employment at will doctrine.
Dismissed employees suffer economic loss, relocation costs, depression, and
loss of self esteem . . . The average worker finds herself in the same position as
that of blacks and women before the existence of the antidiscrimination laws.”
Ann McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a
Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443, 1500 (1995).
McGinley sees the employee discharged for a bad reason as suffering essentially
the same injury as an employee who is discriminated against on the basis of
race, sex, or other group traits.
63
For a discussion of the French employment law controversy from an
American perspective, see William Pfaff, France: The Children’s Hour, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Vol. LIII, No. 8 (May 11, 2006), at 40.
64
See Clyde Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP.
LAB. L. J. 503 (1997) (detailing the unstable nature of most Americans’
employment).
65
See C. trav. Art. L 122-45 (2006).
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discretion,66 which function to protect the rights of employees to
job security and liberty in the workplace. As a result, although the
law prohibits discrimination in hiring as well as disciplining and
termination, the focus is on the protection of incumbent
employees, rather than potential employees.
A. The Labor Code’s Discrimination Provision
The French law that is analogous to Title VII’s prohibition
of employment discrimination under threat of civil liability67 came
into being through a statute on “the liberties of workers in the
enterprise,” which generally protected employees from the
discretion of their employers. The 1982 law provided that “No
employee can be punished or terminated because of his origin, sex,
family situation, or membership in an ethnicity, nation, or race,
political opinions, union membership, or religious convictions.”68
Punishing or sanctioning a worker was defined by the statute as
“any measure, other than verbal observations, taken by the
employer after an act of the employee considered by the employer
to be faulty, whether or not the measure immediately affects the
presence of the worker in the enterprise, his function, his career, or
his pay.”69
The provision was later modified to prohibit
discrimination in recruitment and hiring as well. Codified at Labor
Code L. 122-45, the version of this provision currently in force
provides:
No person can be excluded from a recruitment
procedure or from access to an internship or period
of training in an enterprise, no employee can be
disciplined, terminated, or made the object of a
discriminatory measure, direct or indirect, notably
in matters of pay, training, placement, assignment,
qualification, classification, professional promotion,
change, or contract renewal because of his or her
origin, sex, morals, sexual orientation, age, family
situation, genetic characteristics, membership or
66

See C. trav. Art. L. 122-4 et seq.
Note that French law also imposes criminal liability for intentional
discrimnation in employment. See infra, note 72.
68
Loi no. 82-689 du 4 août 1982 relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans
l’entreprise (1), Section VI, Sous-section II, J.O.R.F. du 6 août 1982, at 2519.
69
Id. See also C. Trav. L. 122-40.
67
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non-membership, real or supposed, in an ethnicity,
nation, or race, his or her political opinions, union
activities,
religious
convictions,
physical
appearance, family name, or, with the exception of
an inability confirmed by the medical inspector of
labor, because of his or her state of health or
handicap.70
Like Title VII and in contrast to the French criminal provision, the
French Labor Code’s antidiscrimination provision prohibits
“indirect” (or disparate impact) discrimination71 as well as
intentional or “direct” discrimination, and applies not only to
hiring and firing, but to all the terms and conditions of
employment, which are spelled out in the provision.
The French prohibition of discrimination in hiring and
firing originated in a criminal provision,72 still in effect, that was
70

C. trav. L. 122-45. (“Aucune personne ne peut être écartée d'une procédure de
recrutement ou de l'accès à un stage ou à une période de formation en entreprise,
aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l'objet d'une mesure
discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte, notamment en matière de rémunération, au
sens de l'article L. 140-2, de mesures d'intéressement ou de distribution
d'actions, de formation, de reclassement, d'affectation, de qualification, de
classification, de promotion professionnelle, de mutation ou de renouvellement
de contrat en raison de son origine, de son sexe, de ses moeurs, de son
orientation sexuelle, de son âge, de sa situation de famille ou de sa grossesse, de
ses caractéristiques génétiques, de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance,
vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation ou une race, de ses opinions
politiques, de ses activités syndicales ou mutualistes, de ses convictions
religieuses, de son apparence physique, de son patronyme ou en raison de son
état de santé ou de son handicap.”)
71
“Indirect” discrimination, a concept imported into French law from European
directives which were themselves influenced by British law, corresponds
roughly to the American notion of “disparate impact” discrimination, developed
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (holding that facially
neutral practices with a disproportionate impact on blacks violate Title VII if
they cannot be justified by reference to business necessity).
72
C. Pén. Art. L. 225-2 makes discrimination punishable by three years’
imprisonment or € 45,000 when it consists of “refusal to hire, disciplining, and
termination.” Article L. 225-1 defines discrimination as “any distinction
operated between physical persons by reason of their origin, their sex, their
family situation, their size, their physical appearance, their family name, their
state of health, their handicap, their genetic characteristics, their morals, the
sexual orientation, their age, their political opinions, their union activities, their
membership or non-membership, real or supposed, in a particular ethnicity,
nation, race, or religion. » C. Pén. Art. 225-1 (Partie législative). (« Constitue
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passed in 1972 as part of a comprehensive anti-racism statute.73
The antiracism statute was enacted before the enactment of the
civil prohibition of employment discrimination was added to the
Labor Code. The rest of the provisions in the 1972 law against
racism had little to do with employment. The law’s focus was on
intentional acts of racism, primarily hate speech, for which the law
imposed criminal liability.74
The French Labor Code’s employment discrimination
provision must also be understood in the context of the broader
legal statutory package that accompanied it, as well as the regime
of employment law into which it was inserted. The 1982 statute
establishing a civil remedy for discriminatory firing and
disciplining in the workplace was part of a series of legal reforms
known as the “Lois Auroux.” Named for the Labor Minister, Jean
Auroux, these laws strengthened employee rights significantly,
particularly with regard to job security and the employee’s right to
participation in the governance of the enterprise.
B. Employee Protection and Republican Citizenship
The reforms were premised on the principle that workers
ought to be citizens and full participants in the enterprise.75 The
une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les personnes physiques à
raison de l'origine, du sexe, de la situation de famille, de l'apparence physique,
du patronyme, de l'état de santé, du handicap, des caractéristiques génétiques,
des moeurs, de l'orientation sexuelle, de l'âge, des opinions politiques, des
activités syndicales, de l'appartenance ou de la non-appartenance, vraie ou
supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion déterminée des
membres ou de certains membres de ces personnes morales. ») Article 225-1
repeats the exact same language as applied to « moral persons, » which include
corporations.
73
Loi No. 72-546 du 1er juillet 1972.
74
The 1972 law modified the freedom of the press statute of 1881, which
already prohibited attacks in the press against racial and religious groups. The
1972 statute strengthened this regulation of racist speech, by criminally
prohibiting speech provoking racial hatred, as well as defamation and insults of
a racial nature, when they were targeted at individuals belonging to these groups
in addition to the groups themselves. Loi No. 72-546 du 1er juillet 1972,art. 1-4.
That statute, the first law prohibiting discrimination, implemented France’s
obligations under the United Nations’ International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
75
Jean Auroux, Les droits des travailleurs, Rapport au Président de la
République et au Premier ministre, Septembre 1981, Collections des rapport
officiels, available at Ladocumentationfrançaise.fr.
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reforms were seen as an extension of the constitutional guarantee
of the right to work. The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution
declares that “[e]ach person has the duty to work and the right to
employment,”76 and that “[a]ll men may defend their rights and
interests through union action and may belong to the union of their
choice.”77 The Preamble also invokes the “right to strike,” to be
exercised within limits set by law.78 It guarantees to all workers
the opportunity to participate in the collective determination of
their conditions of work and in the management of the
workplace.79 The 1946 Preamble re-established the commitment
to workers’ rights that had been established by the Third Republic
in 1936. The Matignon Accords, adopted by Prime Minister Léon
Blum’s government in that year, guaranteed French workers a 40hour workweek and two weeks of paid vacation a year.80 The
1946 Preamble has been incorporated into the constitution that is
currently in force.
The purpose of the 1982 law was to protect workers’ rights
to exercise their “public liberties” in the workplace.81 It was
understood that the public rights of workers necessitated the
regulation of employer discretion, particularly the disciplinary
power of the employer. The statute had three main components:
First, it required all employers with more than 20 employees to
establish internal written rules of conduct for employees,82 making
explicit the conduct that could be punished by the employer.
Second, it protected the employees from being punished by the
employer for certain reasons, limiting the employers’ discretion.83

76

Preamble to the 1946 Const.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See JEAN PELISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT, & ANTOINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU
TRAVAIL 17 (23d ed. 2006). These protections have only gotten better for
French employees. As of 2000, French employees enjoy a 35-hour workweek
and 5 weeks of paid vacation annually. See C. trav. Art. L. 212-1; 223-4.
81
Jean Auroux, Les droits des travailleurs, Rapport au Président de la
République et au Premier ministre, Septembre 1981, La Documentation
Française, at 7.
82
Loi no. 82-689 du 4 août 1982 relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans
l’entreprise (1), art. 1, Journal officiel de la République française (J.O.R.F.) du 6
août 1982, at 2518.
83
Id., art. 1-6.
77
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Third, it protected the right of employees to express their opinions
with regard to the conditions of work in the enterprise.84
All three components of the law were consistent with a
conception of the worker as an equal citizen of the enterprise. One
of the main provisions of the statute was to protect the freedom of
expression of workers, guaranteeing the employee a right to “direct
and collective expression” on matters having to do with the
conditions of work,85 by declaring that the expressed opinions of
an employee, regardless of his or her place in the professional
hierarchy, could not motivate a punishment or termination of the
worker. Furthermore, Auroux’s report proposing the law argued
that workers ought to be agents of change with regard to decisions
that directly interested them.86 Thus, the Auroux law’s prohibition
of discrimination has to be read in light of this conception of the
employee as a citizen of the enterprise, who had rights not to be
treated arbitrarily as well as rights to participation in decisions that
affected him or her.
The 1982 Auroux laws built on a Labor Code that already
protected employee rights to job security. For over a hundred
years, French law has limited arbitrary dismissals, so the protection
against wrongful discharge is much older than the regulation of
employment discrimination. Since 1890, French employers do not
enjoy a unilateral right to terminate an employee for bad reasons.
In fact, at around the same time that employment at will became
the default rule in most U.S. jurisdictions at the end of the 19th
century,87 the legal protection of employees from arbitrary
discharge began to emerge in France. Throughout the twentieth
century, different laws and decrees protected employees from
discharge based on one’s military service88 or performance of other
public duties,89 terminations because one took maternity leave
84

Id. art. 7-10
See Auroux, supra note __, at 8-9. See also Loi no. 82-689 du 4 août 1982
relative aux libertés des travailleurs dans l’entreprise (1), art. 7, J.O.R.F. du 6
août 1982, at 2520. Article 7 added Title VI to Book IV of the Labor Code,
which protected the employees’ right to expression in defining actions towards
improving the conditions of work in the enterprise. Id.
86
Auroux, supra note __, at 15.
87
See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
AM. J. LEG. HIST. 118, 125-26 (1976) (arguing that the American at will rule
emerged and was solidified in treatises around the 1870s).
88
Loi no. 49-1092 du 2 ouût 1949, JORF du 6 août 1949.
89
Decret no. 55-156 du 2 février 1955, JORF du 3 février 1955.
85
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from six weeks before delivery until eight weeks after,90 and
terminations based on participation in strikes. Civil courts also
held discharges based on membership in labor unions91 or based on
religious or political beliefs92 to be abusive.
Furthermore, a 1958 statute imposed on employers the
obligation of notice,93 and another statute in 1967 authorized
severance pay in the case of termination.94 In 1973, the legislature
adopted a Labor Code provision that imposed on employers the
obligation to justify any termination by a true and serious cause,
whether it was individual or economic.95 Before 1973, the
employee bore the burden of proving that a termination was an
abuse of right in order to be entitled to damages. After 1973, the
employer bore the burden of proving that the termination was
justified by a true and serious cause, in order to avoid paying
damages.
Today’s Labor Code imposes a variety of procedural and
substantive duties on employers undertaking to terminate an
employee. For starters, the Labor Code severely restricts the
circumstances under which employers can enter into temporary
employment contracts, known as contracts for a specified duration.
Such contracts are prohibited for jobs related to the normal and
permanent activity of an enterprise.96 The law only allows fixedterm contracts for work that is temporary, such as replacing an
absent employee, a temporary project of the enterprise, or seasonal
work, to name a few examples.97 All other contracts must be
“contracts for an unspecified duration,” and can be terminated at
any time by either party, subject to (very extensive) regulations by
the Code. 98
The Labor Code’s regulations prohibit arbitrary dismissals,
and impose employer costs on carrying out just-cause dismissals.
If an employee is dismissed for any reason other than a “serious
90

Loi no. 50-205 du 11 février 1950, JORF du 12 février 1950.
Judgment of Civil Court, Mar. 18, 1930, D. P. II 171 (Fr.)
92
Judgment of Civil Court of Lille, Feb. 19, 1906 [1909] D. P. II 121 (Fr.).
93
Jean PELISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT, & ANOTINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 20
(23d ed. 2006).
94
Id.
95
Loi no. 73-3 du 13 juillet 1973 ; see generally JEAN PELISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT,
& ANOTINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 22 (23d ed. 2006).
96
C. trav. Art. L. 122-1.
97
C. trav. Art. L. 121-1-1.
98
C. trav. Art. L. 122-4.
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fault,” the Labor Code entitles the employee to a period of notice
of one month if he has been with the employer for at least 6
months, and two months if he has been with the employer for at
least two years.99 The notice is required even when the termination
is justified by a “real and serious cause,” including economic
difficulty. If the notice period is not observed, except in instances
of serious fault, the employee is entitled to damages independent
of the severance pay. The Labor Code also strictly regulates
severance payments. Except in cases of serious fault, a terminated
employee who has worked for the employer for at least two years
is entitled to minimum severance payments calculated by
regulations.100
The Labor Code further requires an employer proposing
termination to send a letter and summons to the employee.101 The
letter must explain the reasons for the proposed termination. The
employee is thus summonsed to an interview, during which the
employer gives the reasons for the proposed decision.102 This
process applies even when the employer proposes to terminate
employees as part of a reduction-in-force of at least 10 employees
in a period of thirty days for economic reasons.103 If the dismissal
falls within this category, the economic reasons have to be
authorized by the competent administrative authority in order for
the termination to be deemed justified.104 If a termination is
unjustified, the employee will be entitled to tort damages105 and/or
reintegration into the job from which he was wrongfully
terminated.106 Finally, even if the termination is justified, either by
economic reasons or “true and serious cause,” the law still requires
the employer to pay severance.
There are also rules governing the burdens in litigation
challenging terminations.
In the case of an economically
motivated termination, the employer has the burden of
communicating to the judge all the elements that he is also
required to communicate to the representatives of personnel and to
the administrative authority competent to approve an economically
99

C. trav. Art. L. 122-6.
C. trav. Art. L. 122-9.
101
C. trav. Art. L. 122-14.
102
C. trav. Art. L. 122-14.
103
C. trav. Art. L. 122-14.
104
C. trav. Art, L. 122-14.
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C. trav. Art. L. 122-13.
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C. trav. Art. L. 122-4-4.
100

21

Suk, Discrimination at Will

motivated layoff.107 If there is any doubt, the presumption lies in
favor of the employee.108
The antidiscrimination provision of the Labor Code reflects
the understanding that what’s really wrong with employment
discrimination is not the harms it occasions on racial or ethnic
subgroups of the population, but the harm to certain universal
ideals, such as right of all persons to be free from arbitrary
mistreatment in the workplace. Firing or disciplining someone
because of their race is wrong because race is an arbitrary criterion
on which to make an employment decision. On this logic,
however, race is not the only arbitrary criterion on which to make
an employment decision – nor is it the worst arbitrary criterion. It
is equally wrong, then, to fire or discipline an employee on the
basis of other characteristics that should not be considered, such as
physical appearance, family name, age, and so forth. Furthermore,
this reasoning attributes no particular significance to the history of
racism, sexism, or other group-based animus in France as a
justification for the employment discrimination provision; the
provision is justified by reference to universally applicable ideals
of liberty and equality.
France’s universalistic approach to the problem of
employment discrimination is, in part, of product of a larger raceblind approach to equality. The French guarantee of employees’
rights to dignity and non-arbitrary treatment stems from the French
conception of republican citizenship. To envision the worker as a
citizen of the enterprise is to extend the French ideal of political
citizenship to the workplace.109
In this respect, French
employment law does what many American employment law
scholars propose: 110 it regards the workplace as a place where
citizenship values are fostered.
Under the French constitution, the equality of citizens
means that citizens cannot distinguished on the basis of any
arbitrary characteristics, including race. The constitution explicitly

107

C. trav. Art. L. 122-14-3.
C. trav. Art. L. 122-14-3.
109
Auroux, supra note __, at 6.
110
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace Civil Society,
and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 51-55 (2000); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886 (2000); Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from
Work, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 373, 424 (2006);
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prohibits the recognition of any distinctions of race,111 and a 1978
statute prohibits the gathering or storing of data that classifies
persons on the basis of their origins.112 The French principle of
race-blindness is far more rigid than the American norm against
racial classifications.113 As a result, all public policy solutions to
the problem of racial inequality in France are race-neutral and
universalistic. Race-based affirmative action is out of the
question,114 as are any measures that target benefits to members of
groups classified by their origin.
III.

Race Riots and Minority Unemployment
A. Race Riots

111

The Preamble to the 1946 constitution, which has been incorporated into the
1958 constitution that is currently in force, reads:
Following the victory won by free people over regimes that attempted
to enslave and degrade the human person, the French people proclaim
again that every human, without distinction of race, religion, or belief,
possesses inalienable and sacred rights. It solemnly reaffirms the rights
and liberties of man and citizen consecrated by the Declaration of
Rights of Man of 1789 and the fundamental principles recognized by
the laws of the Republic.
The passage, in the original reads :
Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres
sur les régimes qui ont tenté d'asservir et de dégrader la
personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que
tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de
croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés. Il réaffirme
solennellement les droits et libertés de l'homme et du citoyen
consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes
fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République.
CONST., Preamble (IVe République) (Fr.)
112
Loi no. 78-18 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers, et aux
libertés, Section 2, art. 8.
113
For comparisons of French and American race-blindness, see Erik Bleich,
Anti-racism Without Races: Politics and Policy in a “Color-Blind” State, in
RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 162 (Herrich Chapman & Laura L. Frader eds. 2004); Robert C.
Lieberman, A Tale of Two Countries: The Politics of Color-Blindness in France
and the United States, in Race in France, supra, at 189; Julie C. Suk, Equal by
Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2007).
114
However, affirmative action programs based on socioeconomic disadvantage,
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For several weeks in November 2005, many young people
in the poorest urban areas throughout France participated in waves
of violence. This has brought racial inequality to the forefront of
French public debate. The riots were precipitated by the death of
two young North African men who were accidentally electrocuted
while hiding in a dangerous location for fear of being harassed by
the police. 115 It was a well-known fact that young North Africans
were frequently subject to police harassment in the banlieues.116
After these deaths, many young people in the banlieues burned
cars, burned schools, and had violent confrontations with the
police.
The predominant understanding by French intellectuals,
politicians, and the media, was that the wave of violence was not
only a protest against this particular event or police harassment,
but rather, an angry reaction to all that is wrong with life in the
banlieues, the poor urban areas on the outskirts of French cities.
The most cited fact was the high rates of unemployment in these
areas.117 The unemployment rate is disproportionately higher for
members of visible minority groups in France than for others.118
Although statistical data with regard to racial and ethnic minorities
is rare in France, due the force of all the legal norms against
making legal distinctions or collective race-based data, limited
studies by sociologists provide some evidence of racial disparities
in France.
B. Unemployment
Sociologists estimate the unemployment rate in the heavily
North African banlieues at about 40 percent. First and second
generation North African immigrants also typically confront
failing schools, increased segregation, discrimination in hiring,
everyday racism, police harassment, and increasing levels of
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incarceration amongst young men in the banlieues.119 In reporting
on the riots, the New York Times interviewed several immigrants in
the banlieues who complained of discrimination in employment.
One Kader, age 23, who said “On paper we’re all the same, but if
your name is Mohamed, even with a good education, you can only
find a job as a porter at the airport.”120
It is undisputed that North African immigrants and French
citizens of North African descent fare worse in their employment
prospects than French citizens of European descent. Because of
the strong norms against collecting statistical data that classifies
persons by race, class, and origin, the data supporting this
conclusion is by no means comprehensive. Nonetheless, the
statistics that have been collected are consistent with the inference
that, by most measures, persons of North African descent are
disadvantaged in employment relative to other residents of France.
Some statistical data collected through voluntary surveys is
available from the Institut national de la statistique et d’études
économiques (INSEE, or National Institute for Statistics and
Economic Studies), which produces an annual study of immigrants
in France. The most recent report concluded that, amongst persons
between the ages of 25 and 59 years of North African, subsaharan
African, or Turkish origin, the unemployment rate was 20%,
approximately double the national unemployment rate.121 For
immigrants from European countries, the unemployment rate was
6.1%, which was lower than the unemployment rate for nonimmigrants, which was 7.2%.122 A 1999 survey studying the
descendants of immigrants (ie second generation), the results did
not vary significantly. The unemployment rate for secondgeneration Algerian men was 23.2 %, as compared with 10.1
percent for French men born of two French-born parents.123
INSEE also studied unemployment rates for foreign
residents of France between the ages of 30 and 39. It is not
119
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surprising that the unemployment rate for all foreigners is, at
23.7%, more than double the national unemployment rate. But
some foreigners do better than others. The study shows that the
unemployment rates for Algerians, Morroccoans, Tunisians, other
nationalities of Africa, and Turks are 37.3%, 35.4%, 35.8%,
36.8%, and 31.6% respectively.
Compare this to the
unemployment rates for Spanish, Italian, Portuguese foreign
residents in France, which are at 15.1%, 13.8%, and 10.1%.
Foreigners of Vietnamese, Latian, and Combodian descent in this
age group had an unemployment rate of 23.7%.124
Another public research body, the Centre d’études et de
recherches sur les qualifications (CEREQ), produced a study in
2004 of young people who had finished their education and
attempted to enter the workforce in 1998. The data was compiled
based entirely on voluntary responses to questionnaires
administered by phone or mail to a random sampling of about a
third of the 1.2 milliion young people entering the workforce.125
Based on this data, statisticians have concluded that a French
citizen of North African origin with a high school diploma was 1.6
times more likely to be unemployed in the first three years after
graduating than a French citizen with French parents and the
equivalent educational qualification.126
Historical data also support the conclusion that the
employment gap between persons of North African descent and
other French residents has gotten wider over the last several
decades during which antidiscrimination law has been in effect.
The unemployment rate for immigrants of North African origin has
steadily increased over the last thirty years. In the period from
1975 to 1990, young North African men comprised between 915% of all unemployed persons in 1975.127 In 1982, they
constituted 19-38% of all unemployed persons, and in 1990, they
constituted 34-45 % of all unemployed persons.128 Indeed,
the
124
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North African population in France has also grown since 1975, but
today, persons of North African descent constitute less than 10 %
of the population. Thus, they are disproportionately represented
amongst the unemployed population.
The difficulties faced by North Africans and blacks in
finding employment were emphasized by French lawmakers in
their response to the riots.129 The widespread joblessness explains
why these young people have the time to engage in criminal
activity, and also why this population is protesting, to the degree
that the violence is understood as protest. The wave of violence in
November 2005 led the French government to adopt new laws on
the “equality of opportunity”130 in response.
C. How Job Security Protections Have Exacerbated
Racial Inequality in France
Although few French people are willing to say so
explicitly, the data support the conclusion that French job security
protections for all workers have, over time, exacerbated racial
inequality and amplified employers’ incentives to discriminate
against North Africans and other foreigners. Over the last thirty
years, French law has strengthened employee job security
protection. Reforms have sometimes included measures to make
the employment discrimination prohibition more effective, if
prompted by an EU directive.131 Nonetheless, racial inequality in
access to employment has worsened.
Between 1974 and 1986, the national unemployment rate
grew from 3 percent to 11 percent.132 For the last twenty years,
unemployment has hovered around 10 percent.133 Of those who
are unemployed, many suffer from long-term unemployment,
defined as a bout of joblessness of one year. Between 1985 and
129
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1995, more then twenty percent of the unemployed were jobless
for more than two years.
During the “trente glorieuses,” the thirty “glory” years of
economic growth in France from 1945-1975, the France enjoyed a
full-employment economy. In the 1960s, for instance, the
unemployment rate was under 2 percent,134 and the entry of guest
workers and immigrants was encouraged to keep up with the pace
of economic growth.135 Immigrants, since they entered France as
guestworkers to fill the demand for labor, were employed during
the 1960s
From1974-1981, unemployment rose from 3 percent to 7
percent, and from 1981 to 1986, it grew to 11 percent.136
Historians and economists have devoted a wealth of literature to
exploring the causes of the growth of unemployment in France
during this period.137
A recent OECD study observes that employee protection
legislation has played a significant role in keeping unemployment
levels high in France.138 Under the Labor Code’s regulations that
ensure the employment contracts are not terminable at will, firing
an employee, even an unproductive employee, is extremely costly
for the employer.139 With the exception of “serious fault,” even
terminations for economic reasons or just cause, which are
permissible under the Code, cost the employer procedural costs
and severance payments. A 1995 study shows that employers lose
134
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74% of litigated wrongful termination cases in France (as
compared with 48% in Canada, 51 % in Italy, and 38% in Great
Britain).140 One economic study estimates the marginal cost of
terminating one worker at 14 months’ wages of a median wage
worker.141
As a result, employers rarely create new jobs in France,
leaving very few positions open to young people attempting to
enter the labor market. Throughout the 1990s, 50 percent of the
unemployed were young people, between the ages of twenty-one to
thirty.142 This problem was often discussed in debates about the
CPE. French business leaders claimed that they would hire more
people if it were not so costly to lay off an employee.143 Without
the severance pay obligations under the Labor Code, a business
could take more risks, and hire more people than absolutely
necessary without taking into account firing costs if the business
does not meet its projected targets.144
Even if the job security laws are not the primary or
exclusive cause of the high levels of youth unemployment in
France, any evaluation of the job security laws from the
perspective of racial equality has to consider the high French
unemployment rate, at around 10%, as given. In the context of
such a high and constant (20 years and counting) unemployment
rate, job security laws have had a disproportionate adverse impact
on racial minorities. The increased costs of termination affect the
ways in which employers exercise their discretion in hiring. An
employer knowing how costly it will be to fire a full-time
employee is less likely to hire candidates whom they consider risky
hires. This leads to both “rational” and racially biased failures to
hire racial minorities.
When unemployment is high, employers find it easier to
find white males to substitute for minorities a slack labor market,
140
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since there will be an abundance of qualified whites available for
the job.145 The inability to fire someone without “just cause” will
lead employers to be more selective in hiring, and selectivity will
be higher when the ratio of candidates to available positions is high
– which is inevitable when unemployment rates are high. Higher
selectivity increases the opportunities for two types of employer
decisions that undermine minorities’ access to employment.
1. Merit-Based Failures to Hire. Increased selectivity
makes it far more difficult for persons with fewer qualifications
(such as education, diplomas, experience) to be hired. When an
employer In a society where residential segregation has resulted in
a correlation between membership in a minority group and
educational achievement, racial minorities will be disadvantaged
by increased selectivity in hiring processes. As a result of patterns
of residential segregation and their social consequences, young
people of North African descent are disproportionately less
qualified for employment than others. Persons of North African
descent are concentrated in particular banlieus, as a result of
French housing policies over the last thirty years. Many North
Africans arrived in France in the 1960s as temporary workers, and
were thus housed in publicly funded housing projects separately
from French nationals in the public housing system.146
Furthermore, housing discrimination in the private sector made it
difficult for visible minorities to find housing outside of the public
sector.147 As a result, many North Africans have remained in
public housing in the banlieues. As many industrial enterprises
reduced their workforce by 40% between 1975-1990, the
unemployment rates in the banlieues rose significantly.148
145
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The residential segregation has led to educational
segregation. In the “zones urbaines sensibles” (ZUS), or “urban
sensitive zones,” which were designated based on socio-economic
indicators in 1981, there are larger percentages of students who are
left behind, and lower percentages of students succeeding in the
national diploma relative to the French average.149 National
education statistics indicate a 10 point gap in sixth-grade
standardized tests in average scores (on a 100-point scale) between
students with two immigrant parents as contrasted to students with
two French-born parents.150 Only 46.9% of the children of
immigrants finish the Baccalauréat (Bac), the high school diploma
necessary to advance to university education, as contrasted with
63.7% of children with French nationality. One study indicates
that 31 percent of youth from a recent immigrant background exits
the education system without a diploma of any kind, as compared
to 14 percent of French-born youths.151
Young people of North African origin in the banlieues have
difficulty finding employment, due in significant part to their lack
of educational success. A 2004 report indicates that, for persons
under the age of 25 years, the national unemployment rate is 23
percent, but in the ZUS, the unemployment rate for persons in this
age group is 38 percent.152 The youth unemployment rate in
France is so high that competition for every available job is fierce.
A young person’s employment prospects are directly correlated to
his or her educational background. A 2003 INSEE study of
persons 15-29 years of age (excluding those continuing their
education) indicates that 59.9% of persons with a Bac or
equivalent are employed in contracts of indeterminate duration, as
compared with 42.7% of persons without any diploma.153 72.2%
149

See Assemblée Nationale, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires
culturelles, familiales, et sociales sur le projet de loi pour l’égalité des chances,
par M. Laurent Hénart, 25 janvier 2006, at 14-15.
150
Education Nationale, panel 1995 et évaluations nationales à l’entrée en 6e.
151
INSEE, La promotion sociale des jeunes dans les quartiers en difficulté,
Rapport, June 2003, at 10.
152
Claude Bébéar, Rapport au Premier Ministre, Minorités visibles: Relever le
défi de l’accès à l’emploi et de l’intégration dans l’entrerpise, Des entreprises
aux couleurs de la France, at 14, (November 2004).
153
INSEE, Enquête Emploi, actifs occupés de 15 à 29 ans interrogés pour la
première fois en 2003 et présents lors des quatre trimestres suivants (sont exclus
les personnes en cours d’étuds initiale, les stagiares, et les apprentis), in Maurin
& Sagadin, at 36.

31

Suk, Discrimination at Will

of persons in this age group with a Bac plus 2 more years of
education have such jobs.
2. Racially Biased Failures to Hire. Furthermore, the
increased selectivity of a hiring process is likely to amplify the
workings of irrational racial bias. “Just cause” means that you
can’t fire someone for arbitrary reasons – you can’t fire someone
simply because you personally find him annoying, awkward, or
humorless. This will heighten the employer’s mechanisms for
avoiding a bad choice. When the number of qualified applicants
for a job is high, the employer has incentives to use irrational
proxies, such as racial stereotypes, as a basis for excluding some of
the candidates.
Forcing employers into a lifelong commitment with anyone
they hire makes the initial hiring decision more and more like
choosing a marriage partner or adoptive family member. It is
reasonable to conclude that, particularly in a high-unemployment
labor market, in which there are far more qualified applicants than
there are positions, this dynamic will disadvantage those who seem
less familiar, more foreign, or culturally different.154 Racial bias,
not only against disfavored groups, but also in favor of those most
like oneself, excludes minorities. The bias may be overt and
conscious or implicit and unconscious. Either way, minorities
lose.
This hypothesis is consistent with some available data with
regard to hiring discrimination. Organizations like SOS-Racisme
and Observatoire des discriminations have conducted various
“testing” operations whereby a job candidate sends an identical
CV, one bearing an Arab name and address in a banlieue and
another bearing a traditional French name and address in a
respectable Parisian neighborhood.155 In many of these studies, the
Arab name resume is rejected without an interview, whereas the
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French name resume is invited for an interview.156 In one study,
researchers sent two identical CVs to 258 employers, with the only
difference between the two CVs being the name of the candidate.
One CV bore a “traditional” French first and last name, whereas
the other bore a North African first and last name. The first CV
received 75 requests for an interview, whereas the second received
14.157 This study demonstrates the persistence of racial bias
amongst employers. The CVs listed the same address for both
names.
Sociologists are now only beginning to collect qualitative
interview data describing the experience of racial minorities in
various aspects of employment.158 A young person of North
African descent reported that despite his having obtained a
baccalaureate and a master’s degree in psychology, he was having
difficulty finding an internship necessary to become a
psychologist. He reported:
I do not want to be a pessimist, but to have the
qualification “bac plus five” and to be unemployed .
..
The problem is the basic problem, that is, today, if
you are Maghrebin it’s hard to find a position.
They make you feel when you are interviewed, that
it’s just a formality, or, I don’t know what, but they
make you feel that way. You go through the
interview, and they tell you they’ll call you back,
but in the end they never call you back. My letters
remain without response, maybe it’s because of my
name but I don’t know. I don’t know if this is
discrimination, but it is a problem. . . . There is no
room for foreigners, and when they take you, it’s to
clean behind a bar, where they can’t see you!159
In other contexts, such as hiring for the police force,
sociologists have studied the pervasiveness of racial stereotyping.
156
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For instance, candidates of North African origin report being asked
what they would do if their brother were arrested.160 In a
supermarket, one Algerian employee has reported racial
segregation – the placement of Algerians away from cash registers
and in the stocking areas, where they are hidden from customers’
view.161
In an economy with such high rates of unemployment
amongst the young, employers are overwhelmed with job
applications for every available position. This increases the
discretionary power of the employer in hiring; the employer must
find ways of distinguishing desirable from undesirable
applicants.162 These decisions cannot rest solely on qualifications,
since there are more qualified applicants than there are positions.
Thus, the opportunity to consider other characteristics that do not
bear on one’s ability to perform the job is amplified. Even if the
employer does not refuse to hire a candidate on the basis of their
race, an employer can easily end up failing to hire minority
candidates as a result of choosing candidates with whom they seem
to “fit” better.
IV.

The Rejected Solutions
A. The Law on the Equality of Opportunities

Consistent with the universalistic approach to policies that
are intended to ameliorate the dismal situation of North African
immigrants in the banlieues, the legislative response to the 2005
race riots was framed in universal, rather than race-conscious,
terms. The statute, styled “Law on the Equality of Opportunities,”
included various race-neutral provisions that were intended to
combat the disadvantages faced by the residents of the banlieues,
many of whom are second-generation immigrant citizens of the
French republic.
The statute was presented as a response to the urban
violence:
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The crisis that came upon certain quarters of our
cities were a revelation. That which we knew, but
at times did not want to see, appeared clearly.
These quarters could seem like the low point of all
the evils of French society: massive failures in the
education system, at times the lack of natural
authority which should be that of the parents,
unemployment, instability, shocking discrimination
. . . 163
The November riots were seen as a reaction to lack of educational
opportunity and unemployment in the suburbs, in addition to
discrimination. But the legislative response mostly attempted to
improve education and employment opportunities in the suburbs
without framing the lack of such opportunities as caused by racism
This legislative response is also
or discrimination.164
representative of the French tendency to universalize the solution
to problems of race discrimination.
In addition to providing incentives to employers to hire
more young people from the disadvantaged zones, the Equality of
Opportunities statute attempted to limit the hiring discretion of
employers. Another provision required employers of a certain size
to accept anonymous CVs at the initial stages of a hiring process.
Article 24 of provides that, in enterprises of more than 50
employees, information requested of job candidates must be
presented in a way that preserves the anonymity of the
candidate.165
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At the same time, the statute increased the discretion of
employers with regard to termination, in a provision that proved
too unpopular to be sustained. Article 8 of the statute created a
new form of employment contract, the “contrat première
embauche,” (CPE) or first employment contract, which could be
terminated at the will of either party without just cause in the first
two years of employment.166 After the first two years, the contract
would become a contract for an unspecified period, governed by
the Labor Code’s strong job security protections. Only employers
with 20 or more employees could enter into these contracts, which
were limited to employees under the age of 26 years and entering
into their first job. An employer could terminate the CPE without
incurring normal obligations under the Labor Code’s job security
protections.
B. Student Strikes and Employment At Will
After the Equality of Opportunities law was adopted, over a
million young people took to the streets to protest the CPE. The
protesters consisted mainly of university students from middleclass backgrounds. According to one sociologist, there was little
geographical overlap between the March protests against the CPE
and the November 2005 protests.167
The opponents of the CPE saw the provision as the
beginning of the end, a symbolic first step towards the dismantling
of the Labor Code’s protections of employee job security and the
egalitarian republican values for which they stood. The CPE
validated unstable employment, which many young people
rejected. The very notion that an employee could work for two
years and then be fired for no reason, without the normal severance
pay was, for the movement’s leaders, “scandalous.”168 They
predicted that this would lead employers to replace those hired
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with new CPE employees every two years,169 instead of retaining
the CPE employee after two years as a permanent employee
protected by the Labor Code. They rejected the premise that the
CPE would create more jobs, and predicted that jobs that might
otherwise be contracts of unspecified duration (with all the
ordinary protections of the Labor Code) would become CPE jobs,
simply increasing the percentage of French workers with
precarious employment without creating more jobs.
They were probably right on the latter prediction. The CPE
would have created more jobs from which employees could easily
be terminated, and fewer jobs in which employees enjoyed the
extensive job security protections. This development would have
benefited the least advantaged, least qualified employment
candidates in the population, those who are considered too risky to
be hired immediately into lifelong positions. It would have created
more points of entry into the labor market, which gives
opportunities to more people, while giving long-term security to
fewer people.
Ultimately, the social movement against the CPE prevailed.
After protests that turned violent, and strikes that disrupted
schools, universities, post offices, banks, government offices, and
transportation, Chirac eventually repealed the unpopular provision.
The legislature went back to the drawing board, and in late April,
adopted a new law on the “access of young people to active life in
enterprises.”170
C. The Anonymous CV and Incentives to Promote
Minority Hiring
The most interesting consequence of these controversies is
that, once the Government withdrew the CPE provision, employers
became increasingly vocal against the anonymous CV provision of
the Equal Opportunities law. In October 2006, the government
announced recently, however, that the anonymous CV rule would
not be enforced due to resistance from enterprises.171
169
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After the CPE provision was repealed, a new version of the
law, adopted in April 2006, provided that employers would receive
a subsidy from the state for entering into employment contracts to
specific classes of disadvantaged persons: (1) young people
between 16 and 25 whose level of education is inferior to that of a
second-cycle diploma (equivalent to bachelor’s degree in the
United States): (2) young people of the same age group residing in
urban sensitive zones; or (3) young people who are in a “contract
of insertion in social life” with the state.172 The “contract of
insertion in social life” refers to a state program for young people
between 15 and 25 years of age who are having difficulties in
social and professional integration. Participants in the program are
provided with the assistance of a local state agency in finding a
job, professional training, specific measures to address difficulties,
and assistance in the job search.173
The new law provides incentives for employers who
voluntarily recruit young people from disadvantaged backgrounds.
A parallel can be drawn to U.S. policies of requiring companies
contracting with the federal government to adopt affirmative action
programs. It remains to be seen, however, whether this provision
will actually increase minority hiring in a world where every
employee, once hired, is legally guaranteed job security. In light
of employers’ resistance to the seemingly innocuous proposal that
they require the anonymous of CVs from job applicants, the
outlook is not optimistic.
V.

The Political Economy of Employment Discrimination

A. French Lessons: Comparative Method
What are the lessons for the American law of equal
employment opportunity?
There are obviously significant
differences in history, legal institutions, culture, racial and ethnic
minorities between France and the United States. I have explored
these in more detail elsewhere,174 and concluded that these
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differences cast doubt on the applicability of mutual lessons.175
Understanding what went wrong in France for racial inequality
does not give us perfect, or even reliable information about what
will go wrong in the United States. But a comparative perspective
can unsettle our basic intuitions about the relationship of job
security protections to racial equality. Doing so brings into sharper
focus the new problems that can come into play as a result of
reforming employment law. These problems may undermine the
goals of employment discrimination law in different ways that at
will employment does. Such possibilities must be understood by
those interested in fixing the inadequacies of Title VII.
American lawyers and scholars tend to focus on the
problems raised by the litigation of discrimination cases –
including barriers to judgment for plaintiffs and employer
incentives generated by the threat of litigation – rather than on the
broader political economy of employment.
Examining the
relationship between job security protection and the
disproportionately high levels of racial-minority unemployment in
France enables the American observer to see the big picture,
beyond these litigation-centered concerns, more clearly.176 It may
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be easier for the American lawyer to notice the tension between
employee job security protections and racial equality in a foreign
context rather than in one’s own country, largely because one is
more removed from the political consequences of noticing such
problems outside of one’s own borders.177
The consequences of universal employee job security
protections for equal employment opportunity in France highlight
the dynamic between limitations on employer firing discretion and
hiring behavior that disadvantages minorities. Comparing the
limitations on employer discretion in hiring and firing in two
national contexts can help illuminate this dynamic. This dynamic
is central to the political economy of employment discrimination,
which is also affected by residential segregation, inequities in
education, and the general unemployment rate.
B. The Persistence of Hiring Discrimination
By treating the prohibition of discrimination in
employment as an element of a larger package of employee job
security protections,178 French law has paid insufficient attention to
the main site of employment discrimination: employers’ exercise
of wide discretion in hiring decisions. Granted, both the Penal and
Labor Codes formally prohibit discrimination in recruitment and
hiring.179 But most of the Labor Code’s extensive regulation of
employer discretion, such as the imposition and regulatory
enforcement of detailed termination procedures, govern the
employment contract itself. Outside of the contract, the Labor
Code limits employer discretion in hiring only by prohibiting
bring to their attempts to achieve racial equality through law in the United
States.
177
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certain types of employment contracts (such as temporary contracts
for the ordinary work of the enterprise) and through a general
prohibition of discriminatory recruitment and hiring which is
enforced through private civil lawsuits or, for the parallel criminal
provision, through prosecution.
These formal prohibitions of discriminatory hiring have no
deterrent effect in France. The reality is that employers clearly
discriminate against candidates of North African descent, resulting
in this population’s disproportionately high levels of
unemployment.180 The persistence of discrimination in hiring,
despite the formal legal prohibition of such conduct, is explained
by barriers to the effective enforcement of this prohibition in
French criminal and civil procedure. In short, convictions for
discriminatory hiring under the Penal Code are rare due to the
intent requirement and burden of proof for criminal liability, and
employers are rarely found civilly liable for discriminatory hiring
because the lack of discovery in French civil procedure makes it
nearly impossible for plaintiffs to prove even the most basic facts
that could give rise to an inference of discrimination. 181 Most
discrimination cases are brought in criminal proceedings, and
convictions are very rare. Antidiscrimination law hardly deters
even the most overt forms of discrimination.
By comparison with France, the civil litigation under Title
VII has been very effective in deterring overt discrimination. In
the first two years of Title VII enforcement, EEOC charges based
on hiring discrimination allegations outnumbered termination
charges by 50 percent.182 Any employer who failed to hire
qualified blacks in the late 1960s or early 1970s would probably
Overt forms of
have faced a class-action lawsuit.183
discrimination, such as a systematic refusal to hire blacks, were
likely to produce plaintiff victories at the time, in light of the
widespread understanding that the purpose of the statute was to
combat these forms of discrimination in recruitment and hiring.184
As Donohue and Siegelman observe: “A rational employer in
180
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1965 need not have waited until he was actually sued to change his
employment practices. Thus, the mere threat of litigation would
probably have induced an employer to change his behavior.”185
The threat of litigation for overtly discriminating, either at the
hiring or firing stage, has effectively driven out discriminatory
behavior by employers in which the racially discriminatory motive
is apparent.
But many American scholars note that most of the
behaviors that cause inequality in the workplace today can be
attributed to implicit bias rather than the overt manifestation of
racial bias that Title VII litigation can effectively remedy and
deter.186 The current high ratio Title VII firing cases relative to
hiring cases does not necessarily support the inference that firing
discrimination is more common than hiring discrimination.187
Rather, employers continue to engage in a variety of subtle
practices that undermine racial minorities’ access to good jobs. As
Linda Hamilton Krieger has shown, the cognitive processes that
lead employers to discriminate are automatic; they use
“stereotypes, scripts, and schemas” to interpret information
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relevant to social, judgments188 including judgments about who is
the ideal candidate for a given job. Title VII has effectively driven
out obvious and overt discrimination,189 but subtler forms of hiring
discrimination that are difficult to prove in civil litigation persist in
the United States.190 Many scholars have criticized Title VII for its
inability to deter or remedy the subtler forms of discrimination.
C. Firing Discretion and the Migration of Discriminatory
Tendencies
The French experience shows that a general limitation on
the employer’s firing discretion, by way of job security
protections, can magnify employers’ tendencies to discriminate in
hiring. In other words, general constraints on employers’ firing
discretion cause racial bias to migrate from firing decisions to the
hiring decisions. This dynamic is similar to the dynamic discussed
by Posner, Donohue, Siegelman, and Ayres, by which Title VII’s
regulation of discriminatory firing effectively imposes a “tax” on
minority hiring. In the United States, limiting employers’ firing
discretion may not increase the incidence of overt hiring
discrimination, given how effective Title VII is at deterring overt
discrimination. But strong limitations on employers’ firing
discretion, by way of job security protection, can increase the
likelihood that racial bias, both conscious and implicit, will be
manifested in an employment decision. In France, this means that,
since discretion over firing is virtually nonexistent, all of the
employers’ discriminatory tendencies migrate to the exercise of
hiring discretion. When a law limits employers’ discretion over
firing broadly, as applied to every employee, the law does not
eradicate the discriminatory tendency: it simply moves
188
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discrimination to decisions over which employers retain discretion,
namely hiring decisions.
In the United States, Title VII’s success in driving out overt
discrimination has not extinguished discriminatory tendencies.
Rather, racial bias has morphed and migrated.191 Now, it is
manifested in more subtle forms of employer conduct, both at the
hiring stage and at the firing stage (and in between). Tot he extent
that freedom of contract gives employers discretion over hiring,
employers can exercise it in ways that manifest racial bias without
the overtness often needed as a practical matter to establish a Title
VII violation in a litigated case. And, to the extent that
employment at will gives employers broad latitude to fire,
employers can exercise that discretion in ways that manifest racial
bias without generating the direct evidence often needed as a
practical matter to establish a Title VII violation after the Hicks
line of cases. To sum up: in neither country does employment law
eradicate racial bias. Rather, the law functions to move racial bias
to the employment decision over which employers legally exercise
the greatest degree of discretion. In France, it’s the hiring
decision. In the United States, it’s the firing decision.
Furthermore, subtle forms of hiring discrimination persist
in the United States, even though hiring discrimination is not
litigated as frequently as firing discrimination. Existing empirical
data192 support the conclusion that implicit racial bias continues
affect employers’ exercise of hiring discretion in the United States.
A recent Chicago study establishing that, when identical resumes
are sent to employers with African American and white sounding
names, white names receive 50 percent more callbacks than
African American ones.193
Another study, by Devah Pager,
191
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demonstrates that hiring discrimination against blacks is so great
that a black applicant without a criminal record has the same
chance of success as a white applicant with a criminal record.194
Many other audit-pair studies, in which the testers were trained to
exhibit similar personal characteristics, also establish that whites
are more likely than blacks with the same qualifications to be
offered interviews or jobs.195
Imagine these employers making hiring decisions in a legal
regime that prohibits them from terminating any employee except
for cause. Increasing employers’ risk-aversion in hiring can also
exacerbate irrational discrimination. The knowledge that it will be
difficult to fire anybody who is hired creates incentives for
employers to pick people with whom he feels comfortable and
familiar. The potential for a lifetime relationship drives up the
significance of solidarity, trust, and loyalty. This strengthens the
reliance on stereotypes, scripts, and schemas in choosing
employees.
The historical experience of internal job markets in the
United States is instructive. In the United States, prior to the
1970s, many employees enjoyed job security, even in an at-will
legal regime, because their employers observed the social norm of
promising lifetime employment, in firms that were structured to
enable employees to move up the ladder at the same firm
throughout their careers. Women were not hired by large
corporations with internal labor markets, largely because
employers assumed that women would quit or disrupt their
progress up the job ladder to have children.196 Internal labor
markets also excluded black employees.197 Promises of job
security were often obtained when unions negotiated for them with
employers, and unions excluded or segregated on the basis of race.
The forms of solidarity and trust associated with lifetime
employment and job security protection may sharpen an
employer’s tendency to avoid hiring persons who, by stereotype
and scheme, seem like outsiders.
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Moreover, in the absence of the liberty to terminate at will,
one can reasonably predict that employers will be reluctant to
practice voluntary affirmative action in hiring to the same extent as
they do the at-will world. Affirmative action is a form of risktaking. It also plays an important role in integrating the American
workplace,198 which could easily be eroded by a for-cause regime.
The French employers’ resistance to the anonymous CV rule is
telling. While the provision was passed as part of the statutory
package that included the employment at-will provision, resistance
to the anonymous CV provision grew after the student movements
buried employment at will. Surely this is not a mere coincidence.
Although racial inequality in the United States is different
in various respects from the situation in France, one similarity that
should not be overlooked is the high level of residential
segregation that has led to low levels of educational achievement
amongst African Americans.199 The rational employer will
naturally be more risk-averse, knowing that it will be extremely
difficult and costly to fire someone once hired. The difficulty of
firing will strengthen the desire to avoid hiring persons with fewer
educational credentials. To the extent that the black-white gap in
education remains a reality in the United States, this dynamic can
work to the disadvantage of blacks. Therefore, in the U.S. context,
a for-cause regime can exacerbate a whole range of discriminatory
tendencies in hiring.
VI.

Rethinking Equal Employment Opportunity Law

The French experience highlights two important lessons:
First, it highlights the need for equal employment opportunity law
to manage the manifestations of racial bias that it is unable to
eradicate. Second, it provides a concrete example of the limits of
race-neutral universalistic approaches to addressing racial
discrimination in employment.
A. The Management of Racial Bias
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Racial bias, of both the overt and implicit varieties, tends to
express itself in the employment decisions over which employers
retain discretion. Both job security laws and employment
discrimination laws impose limits on employer discretion. In so
doing, they push the racial bias into the remaining areas of
discretion. In both countries, employer hiring decisions remain
vulnerable to the intrusion of racial bias because neither state is
likely to completely eradicate the employer’s freedom to hire
whomever they please. Even as this freedom is limited by a
prohibition on discriminatory hiring, enough discretion remains
such that employers can easily manifest forms of racial bias that
are difficult to prove in litigation. As a result, tightening firing
discretion amplifies the manifestation of racial bias in hiring. In
the context of strong job security protections, French employers
have been reluctant to adopt even the most color-blind, innocuous
measures such as the requirement that candidates submit
anonymous CVs.
Any proposed reform of employment law or employment
discrimination law undertaken to combat discrimination and
achieve equal employment opportunity must take these dynamics
into account. The French experience helps us imagine the
possibility that a for-cause employment regime can create different
and potentially worse problems of discrimination in employment
than the ones that the at will regime has produced. For-cause
employment will benefit plaintiffs in Title VII termination cases,
but, over time, how might it affect minorities entering the job
market? Might it exacerbate the racial minorities’ disadvantage in
access to employment? If so, to what extent? These are precisely
the questions that need to be explored if employment law is to
serve the goals of employment discrimination law.
If equal opportunity is the goal of employment
discrimination law, the effect of employment law norms on the
overall employment prospects of disadvantaged groups in the longterm requires far more attention than litigation has been able to
generate. Thus, a broader regulatory approach to employment
discrimination and equal employment opportunity is needed, to
supplement the remedies achieved when enforcement occurs
primarily through litigation.200 Applying this big-picture approach
200
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requires consideration of the following question? What is worse
for the long-term goal of eradicating racial disadvantage in
employment, exclusion from entry into the labor market, or
discriminatory termination?
A definitive and detailed answer to this question is beyond
the scope of this article, but I offer some preliminary
considerations. This question should not be answered in the
abstract; it must take into account the realities of today’s
workplace and the political economy of employment.
As
Katherine V.W. Stone has documented in great depth, the
American workplace has undergone a tremendous transformation
throughout the twentieth century. Up until the 1970s, employment
for most American workers was centered on a single, primary
employer. Even though employment at will was the law, firms
were generally set up with internal job ladders, and employees
would advance in the ranks within the firm, with mutual
expectations that the employee would stay with the employer for
life.201
But over the last thirty years, the structure of employment
has changed significantly. Now, most American workers have a
“boundaryless career” that does not depend on notions of
advancement within a single hierarchical organization.202
Employees don’t expect to stay with the same firm for life, but
they expect each new job to give them opportunities to improve
their human capital. In this universe, discriminatory failures to
hire racial minorities may diminish their employment opportunities
more severely in the long-run than discriminatory or otherwise
unjust terminations. Thus, equal employment opportunity requires
a shift in focus from the discriminatory firing suits that dominate
the Title VII docket towards legal and regulatory means of
protecting and promoting racial equality at the hiring stage.
B.
Inequality

The Limits of Universalistic Solutions to Racial
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The French resistance to race-targeted, race-conscious
ways of mitigating the disadvantage of racial minorities, such as
race-conscious affirmative action, also provides important lessons.
Specifically, it should raise skepticism about the many race-neutral
approaches that have been proposed as alternatives to raceconscious affirmative action in the pursuit of equal opportunity. In
France, the race-blindness arises from a republican commitment to
social solidarity, which directly conflicts with any race-conscious
distribution of benefits. The universalistic approach of French
employment discrimination law reveals the belief that job security
protections and protection against racial discrimination protect the
same set of rights and interests, rather than interests that may
conflict with each other. Yet, it is clear that job security
protections conflict with racial minorities’ equal access to
employment.
In the United States, employers’ use of affirmative action
may get a lot of minorities hired, but even its most vocal advocates
worry about affirmative action’s potential to harm the social
solidarity that is essential to a truly integrated workplace.203 Doing
what is best for the eradication of racial disadvantage in access to
employment may be at odds with doing what is best from the
standpoint of universal social welfare goals, such as employee job
security and social solidarity. American lawyers and scholars
contemplating reforms to protect employee job security or to
combat racial inequality in employment should anticipate conflicts
between these two goals, rather than assuming that they are always
compatible. The French example shows how job security
protections can freeze racial minorities out of labor markets,
particularly when historical and social circumstances have
contributed to their being undereducated and regarded as foreign.
Job security protections under such conditions directly conflict
with measures like the CPE that could improve racial minorities’
employment prospects. Furthermore, the CPE itself was a
universalistic solution to the particular problem of racial
disadvantage: The introduction of at-will employment applicable
to all young people was proposed because there is no alternative of
targeting benefits towards disadvantaged racial groups.
Job security protections and the pursuit of equal
employment opportunity can impose mutual costs on each other.
203
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Universal job security protections might exclude racial minorities
from the labor market in the long run, and measures that target
benefits to racial minorities can have detrimental effects on social
solidarity. Universalistic, race-blind strategies for eradicating
group disadvantage tend to obscure, if not deny, the possibility that
promoting racial equality can conflict with promoting social
welfare for all. This is a conflict that equal employment
opportunity law should negotiate and manage, rather than ignore.
Conclusion
Recognizing the reality of these conflicts and tensions
intensifies the difficulty of proposing a solution to the problem of
racial inequality in employment. We cannot know with any
certainty whether racial minorities would have been better off in
the past if France had adopted American-style antidiscrimination
law and at-will employment, just as we can’t know whether racial
minorities in the United States would be better off today had Title
VII not imposed a “tax” on minority hiring. But it is clear, based
on the two countries’ experiences, that limiting firing discretion
increases discriminatory tendencies in hiring decisions.
If
employment discrimination law is to improve equal employment
opportunity, it must manage these dynamics with the goal of
minimizing the overall effect of racial bias, overt and implicit, in
racial minorities’ access to, and retention of, good jobs. This may
require job security protections in some contexts and at-will
employment in others.
Unequal employment opportunity, in both the United
Statesnd France, will continue to pose challenges for a long time.
But the difficulty of finding a solution is no argument for avoiding
an honest account of the problem.
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